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The present paper makes an attempt to examine theoretically the impact of emigration of skilled 
labour from developing countries on the level of welfare of the non-migrants and the level of 
urban unemployment of unskilled labour in a three sector Harris-Todaro model. The analysis 
suggests that in a reasonable production structure for a developing economy a brain drain of 
skilled labour raises urban unemployment of unskilled labour. The paper also shows that an 
emigration of skilled labour may raise the welfare of the non-migrants in a tariff-distorted 
economy if it imports the specialized manufacturing product or the labour-intensive good. 
However, if the economy imports the traditional manufacturing product, the welfare of the non-
emigrating workers is likely to deteriorate. 
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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF SKILLED LABOUR, WELFARE AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT OF UNSKILLED LABOUR: A NOTE 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
There exists a traditional theoretical literature on the effect of international migration from a less 
developed country on the welfare of the non-migrants in that country. Notable contributions in 
this field are Bhagwati and Rodrigues (1975), Rivera-Batiz (1982, 1984), Thompson (1984), 
Djajic (1986), Quibria (1988), etc. The traditional result in the literature is that, in a two-product 
small open economy, any given amount of emigration does not affect the welfare of the non-
migrants because the presence or the absence of the migrant group in the population implies the 
same terms of trade, and hence the same trade opportunity for the non-migrants (see Bhagwati 
and Rodrigues (1975)).  Rivera-Batiz (1982) has shown that if one of the two commodities is 
internationally non-tradable, the emigration, if it is from the non-tradable goods sector, reduces 
the ‘exchange opportunities’ the non-migrants have under the presence of (and with) the 
migrants, in terms of the exchange of traded for non-tradable goods. Relative price of the non-
tradable goods goes up and this adverse terms of trade lowers the welfare of the non-migrants. 
But Quibria (1988) has shown that if any movement of capital does not accompany the 
international migration of labour then per capita availability of capital for the non-migrants labour 
force also rises. This produces a positive income-effect. If the positive income-effect outweighs  
the adverse terms of trade effect, the effect on welfare is exactly opposite to that Rivera-Batiz 
(1982) has found. In these papers neo-classical full-employment framework has been followed. 
However, the LDCs are plagued by high levels of unemployment, especially  in the urban sector. 
So a full-employment neo-classical structure cannot appropriately depict the true picture of the 
labour market in the LDCs. Gupta (1991) in terms of a two-sector dual economy model with 
Harris-Todaro (1970) type of rural-urban migration has shown that the emigration to the foreign 
country worsens the income distribution and hence lowers the welfare of the non-migrants. 
However, in all these papers we do not find any distinction between migrant and non-migrant 
labour force from the viewpoint of skill. 
 
Only in recent years we find that there exists a large number of theoretical and empirical works 
related to various aspects of international trade where the labour force is of two types – skilled 
and unskilled. A representative sample of this literature is difficult to construct. One can refer to 
the works of Berman, Bound and Grilliches (1994), Bhagwati (1995), Borjas and  Ramey (1995),   3 
Leamer (1995), Wood (1995, 1997), Collins (1996), Jones and Engerman (1996), Marjit (1997, 
1998) etc. on this issue. The existing works mainly deal with the impact of trade and technology 
on the skilled - unskilled wage gap. Our idea in this paper, however, is different. We consider the 
simultaneous existence of skilled and unskilled labour in the economy to examine the impact of 
the international migration of skilled labour from the developing countries on the welfare of the 
non-migrants and on the unemployment of unskilled labour. 
 
The present paper is based on a general equilibrium framework. The economy has been broadly 
divided into urban sector and rural sector. The urban sector consists of a specialized 
manufacturing sector and a traditional manufacturing sector. The economy produces two 
exportable commodities and one importable and the import-competing sector is protected by a 
tariff. We refer to the international migration of skilled labour force from developing economies 
as ‘brain drain’.  
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that ‘brain drain’ of skilled labour from developing countries 
should reduce welfare. The analysis of the present paper, however, shows that in a reasonable 
production structure for a developing economy a brain drain of skilled labour may raise the 
welfare of the economy (and of the non-migrants) if it imports the labour-intensive good or the 
specialized manufacturing product. However, if the economy imports the traditional 
manufacturing product, the welfare of the economy unambiguously deteriorates. The welfare of 
the non-emigrating workers is also likely to fall in this case. Also an emigration of skilled labour 
always raises urban unemployment of unskilled labour.  
 
 
2.  The Model 
 
We consider a small open monetised dual economy, which is broadly divided into an urban sector 
and a rural sector. The urban sector is subdivided into two sub-sectors so that all total we have 
three sectors in our economy. The first sector within the urban sector is the manufacturing sector 
that requires only skilled labour
1 apart from capital to produce its product. We refer to the sector 
as the specialized manufacturing  sector.
2  [[Footnote 1: One may consider an alternative 
production structure where sector 1 also requires unskilled labour to produce its output. The 
qualitative results of the model remain unaltered. See also footnote 4 in this context.]]. 
[[Footnote 2: We may call it the ‘R & D’ sector.]]. The second sector within the urban sector is a   4 
manufacturing sector, which produces its product with the help of unskilled labour and capital. 
The third sector  is the rural sector. It has been assumed that it produces its product with unskilled 
labour and capital. So capital is mobile among all the three sectors and unskilled labour is mobile 
between sectors 2 and 3. But skilled labour is specific to sector 1. Owing to our small open 
economy assumption we consider all the three product prices to be given internationally. Let us 
assume that the urban unskilled labour earns a minimum wage W*. The wage rate of the rural 
unskilled labour W and W* (with W* > W) are related by the Harris-Todaro (1970) condition of 
migration equilibrium where the expected urban wage rate equals the rural wage rate. We also 
assume that the economy exports two of the three commodities and is a net importer of the other. 
At this moment we do not specify any specific trade pattern of the economy. Production functions 
exhibit constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. 
 
The following symbols will be used in the equations. 
 
aKi = capital-output ratio in the ith sector, i = 1,2,3; 
aLi = labour-output ratio in the ith sector, i = 1,2,3; 
Pi =  world price of the ith good, i = 1,2,3; 
Pi* = domestic or tariff-inclusive price of the ith good, i = 1,2,3; 
ti =  ad-valorem tariff rate on the ith good and ti ≥ 0; 
WS = wage rate of skilled labour; 
W = wage rate of unskilled labour; 
r = return to capital; 
L* = fixed amount of supply of unskilled labour; 
LU = urban unemployment of unskilled labour; 
LS* = fixed amount of supply of skilled labour; 
K* = fixed capital stock of the economy. 
 
As the economy imports only one commodity and exports the rest only one of the three tis is 
positive and the rest are zero. 
 
A general equilibrium of the system is represented by the following set of equations: 
WS.aLS1 + r.aK1 = P1*                                (1) 
W*.aL2 + r.aK2 = P2*                                 (2) 
W.aL3 + r.aK3 = P3*                                   (3)   5 
aLS1.X1 = LS*                                             (4) 
aK1.X1 + aK2.X2 + aK3.X3 = K*                  (5) 
aL2.X2 + aL3.X3 + LU = L*                         (6)                 
(W*/W).aL2.X2 + aL3.X3 = L*                   (7) 
 
Equation (7) is the  Harris-Todaro (1970) migration equilibrium condition. We have seven 
equations to solve for seven unknowns (WS, W, r, X1, X2, X3 and LU). The system possesses the 
decomposition property. So the three factor prices are determined from the price system alone, 
independently of factor endowments, i.e. from equations (1), (2) and (3). Once we know the 
factor prices, all the factor coefficients are also known. X1, X2 and X3 are then determined from 
equations (4), (5) and (7). Finally, LU is found from (6) once X2 and X3 are known. 
 
Before going to comparative statics, it is important to mention that our measure of welfare in this 
small open economy is national income measured at world prices, Y, and it is expressed as 
follows. 
Y  =  WS.LS* + r.K* + W.L* - ti.Pi.Xi                                           (8) 
 
In equation (8) WS.LS* is the income of the skilled workers within the economy. r.K* is the 
capital income. W.L* is the wage income of the unskilled workers of the economy. Finally, 
ti.Pi.Xi measures the cost of tariff-protection of the ith import-competing sector. The per capita 
income of the non-migrating labouers, y  is given by 
y = (Y / (L* + LS*)) = [(WL* + rK* + WS.LS* - ti.Pi.Xi) / (L* + LS*)]        (8.1)  
 
2.1   Effects of Emigration of Skilled Labour  
 
We shall now consider the impact of emigration of skilled labour on the endogenous variables of 
the system. We assume that the international migration of skilled labour does not deplete the 
economy’s given capital stock
3 and that the labourers are the owners of capital. The latter implies 
that the total population of the economy comprises of only the skilled and unskilled labourers. 
[[Footnote 3: See Quibria (1988). The international movement of capital accompanying an 
emigration of labour may be prevented by government laws.]].  
 
Using the ‘hat mathematics’ of Jones (1965) and noting that K* and L* do not change, from 
equations (4), (5) and (7) we may write   6 
1 ˆ X   = 
* ˆ
S L                                                                       (9) 
λK1. 1 ˆ X    + λK2. 2 ˆ X   + λK3. 3 ˆ X  = 0                              (10) 
λL2. 2 ˆ X  + λL3. 3 ˆ X  = 0                                                   (11) 
where λK1 = (aK1.X1/K*);  λK2 = (aK2.X2/K*); λK3 = (aK3.X3/K*); λL2 = ((W*/W).(aL2.X2/L*)); λL3 
= (aL3.X3/L*) and the circum flex denotes a proportional change. Using (9), equation (10) may be 
rewritten as 
λK2. 2 ˆ X   + λK3. 3 ˆ X  = − λK1.
* ˆ
S L                                              (10.1) 
 
Solving (10.1) and (11) by Cramer’s rule one gets 
2 ˆ X  = − (1/∆).λK1.λL3.
* ˆ
S L   > 0  (since 
* ˆ
S L  < 0 )              ) 
3 ˆ X  =  (1/∆).λK1.λL2.
* ˆ
S L   <  0                                           )     (12)   
where, (∆ = λK2.λL3 − λK3.λL2)  >  0  if  [(λK2/λL2) > (λK3/λL3)], i.e. if sector 2 is relatively capital 
intensive to sector 3 in value terms. So X1 and X3 decrease and X2 increases as LS* decreases 
following an emigration of skilled labour. 
 
The above results can be explained intuitively as follows. An emigration of skilled labour cannot 
change the factor prices (and hence factor coefficients) since these are determined independently 
of the factor endowments. However, as LS* decreases due to an emigration of skilled labour, X1 
decreases since aLS1 does not change. So capital is released from sector 1 which produces a 
Rybczynski effect. If (λK2/λL2) > (λK3/λL3) i.e. if sector 2 is capital intensive relative to sector 3 in 
value terms, X2 increases and X3 decreases
4. [[Footnote 4: Unskilled labour is also released from 
sector 1 if it also uses unskilled labour along with skilled labour and capital to produce its output. 
But despite this modification sector 2 expands and sector 3 contracts if sector 1 is more capital 
intensive than both sector 2 and sector 3 with respect to unskilled labour. The subsequent results 
of the paper remain valid even in this alternative production structure.]]. 
 
Differentiating equation (8) with respect to LS* we get 
(dY/dLS*) = WS  −  ti.Pi.(dXi /dLS*)                                  (8.2) 
 
We now consider the different possible trade patterns for a developing economy. 
   7 
Case I: The country is an importer of the labour-intensive commodity (product of the rural 
sector)
5.           [[ Footnote 5: According to the World Development Report (1991), most less 
developed countries are net importers of food, some of these are net exporters in specific food 
items. For example, Erstwhile Soviet Union, Egypt, Nigeria, Iran, Iraq, South Korea, Brazil, 
Cuba, Mexico etc. are major importers of wheat and have so far operated under a tariff-quota-
subsidy system of trade restrictions. See also Raghavan (1991) and Marjit and Gupta (1995) in 
this context. At the same time there are many newly industrializing economies which have grown 
to be large manufacturing exporters. See Beladi and Marjit (1996), page 932. Also there are 
countries like India which are large exporters of many manufacturing products as well as of 
highly specialized manufacturing products like computer soft-wares.]]. In this case, t3 > 0 but t1, t2 
= 0. A decrease in LS* leads to a contraction of sector 3. So we have (dX3/dLS*) > 0. We can 
show
6 that (dY/dLS*) <  0 iff  [[(WS.LS/W.L*).(θL3 / λK1).{(λK2/λL2) – (λK3/λL3)} <  (t3 / (1+t3))]. 
[[Footnote 6: This result has been proved in appendix I.]].  The per capita income of the non-
migrants, y increases if (not only if) the above condition holds. 
 
Case II: The country is an importer of the specialized manufacturing product and an exporter of 
the other two commodities. This is also a realistic trade pattern for a technologically backward 
country, which may not possess sufficient resources (e.g. skilled labour) and appropriate 
technology to produce sufficient amount of the good to satisfy its domestic demand. In this case, 
t1 > 0 but t2, t3 = 0. A decrease in LS* leads to a contraction of sector 1. In this case (dY/dLS*)  <  
0 iff  θLS1  <  (t1 / (1+t1)) /
7. [[Footnote 7: See appendix I for the proof.]]. In this case too, y 
increases if (not only if) θLS1  <  (t1 / (1+t1)). 
 
Case III: The country is an importer of the traditional manufacturing product. So we have t2 > 0 
but t1, t3 = 0. As X2 increases due to an emigration of skilled workers (dX2/dLS*) < 0. So from 
(8.2) we  find that (dY/dLS*) >  0. The per capita income of the non-migrants is also likely to fall 
unless the size of the economy’s capital stock is abnormally large
8, which is, of course, highly 
implausible for a typical capital scarce less developed economy. [[Footnote 8: See appendix I for 
the mathematical proof.]]. 
 
This establishes the following proposition. 
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PROPOSITION 1:  An emigration of skilled labour from a small open economy with a tariff 
protected import-competing sector raises the welfare of the non-migrants measured in terms of 
the per capita income (i) if [[(WS.LS/W.L*).(θL3 / λK1).{(λK2/λL2) – (λK3/λL3)} <  (t3 / (1+t3))], 
when the economy is an importer of the unskilled labour-intensive commodity; and, (ii) if θLS1  <  
(t1 / (1+t1)) when it imports the specialized manufacturing product. However, if the economy 
imports the traditional manufacturing product, the non-migrating workers are likely to be worse-
off unless the size of capital stock of the economy is abnormally large. 
 
Using (12) from (6) one can derive 
− (1/∆).λL2.λL3.λK1.
* ˆ
S L  [(W/W*) – 1] + λLU.  U L ˆ  = 0 
    (+)                      (−)            (−) 
So,  U L ˆ
  > 0 when LS* decreases. This leads to the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 2: An emigration of skilled labour raises the level of urban unemployment of 
unskilled labour. 
 
Intuition behind the result is fairly straightforward. An international migration of skilled labour 
leads to an expansion of the urban manufacturing sector (sector 2), thereby raises the expected 
urban wage rate of the unskilled labour above the actual rural wage rate. Unskilled labourers 
migrate from the rural sector to the urban sector. The number of new migrants outweighs the 
number of new vacancies created in sector 2 resulting in an increase in the level of urban 
unemployment and a contraction of the rural sector. 
 
3.   Concluding Remarks 
 
The paper theoretically examines the impact of emigration of skilled labour from developing 
economies on the level of social welfare and urban unemployment of unskilled workers in terms 
of a three-sector Harris-Todaro (1970) model. The main contribution of the paper is two-fold. 
First, the paper shows that in a reasonable production structure for a developing economy a brain 
drain of skilled labour raises urban unemployment of unskilled labour. Second, it shows that an 
emigration of skilled labour may raise the welfare of the tariff-distorted economy if it imports the 
specialized manufacturing product or the labour-intensive good. However, if the economy 
imports the traditional manufacturing product, an international migration of skilled labour has   9 
unambiguous adverse effect on the economy’s welfare. These results are important in the context 
of greater openness in the trade and investment regimes and also in the context of the ongoing 
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Appendix I: 
 
Case I: In this case from (8.2) (dY/dLS*) = WS – t3.P3.(dX3/dt3). Using (12) this becomes 
(dY/dLS*) = WS – t3.P3.(λK1.λL2.X3 / ∆..LS*) 
                = [[WS.LS*.λL3.{(λK2/λL2) – (λK3/λL3)} – t3.P3.λK1.X3].[λL2 / LS*.∆]] 
                = X3.[[WS.(LS*/L*).aL3.{(λK2/λL2) – (λK3/λL3)} – t3.P3.λK1].[λL2 / LS*.∆]]        
  = X3.P3*[[(WS.LS*/W.L*).θL3.{(λK2/λL2) - (λK3/λL3)} - (t3/(1+t3))λK1].[λL2 / LS*.∆]] 
                       ((Note that P3* = (1+t3).P3 and θL3 = (W.aL3 / P3*)) 
So  (dY/dLS*)  <  0  iff   [(WS.LS / W.L*).(θL3 / λK1).{(λK2/λL2) – (λK3/λL3)} < (t3/(1+t3))]    (A.1)                                     
 
Case II: 
From (8.2) (dY/dLS*) = WS – (t1.P1 / aLS1) = ((WS.aLS1 – t1.P1) / aLS1) = (P1* / aLS1)(θLS1 – (t1/(1+t1)) 
(Note that from (4) (dX1/dLS*) = (1 / aLS1)) and θLS1 = (WS.aLS1 / P1*) where P1* = (1+t1).P1. 
So (dY/dLS*) < 0 iff  θLS1 < (t1 / (1+t1))                       (A.2) 
If Y increases due to an emigration of skilled labour, the per capita income of the non-migrants, y 
also increases since the size of non-migrant people, (L* + LS*) decreases. 
 
Case III: 
Differentiating equation (8.1) one can derive 
(dy/dLS*) = (1 / (L*+LS*)
2).[L*.(WS – W) – r.K* + t2.P2.{X2 – (L*+LS*).(dX2/dLS)}]            (A.3) 
                                                           (+)                                                          (−)      
The sign of (dy/dLS*) in case III is ambiguous. However from (A.3) it is apparent that the most 
likely sign of (dy/dLS*) is positive unless the size of the domestic capital stock is abnormally 
large which is, of course, quite improbable for a typical capital scarce less developed country.  